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1 
 
At the etymological root of virtue is the Latin word for man, vir.  
Many have noted this connection, but few have known what to 
make of it.  A common, and somewhat predictable, strategy has 
been to leap backward and attempt to resurrect an image of 
heroism – Homeric, Roman, Stoic – as a remedy for the moral 
flabbiness of modern times.  But such anachronistic equations of 
virtue with manhood or courage fail to take into account any of the 
range of associations the word has acquired since Homer.  These 
include doing good, having sex with one person only (or no one at 
all), and establishing a republic – apparently disparate uses which 
are in fact all related.  By considering their common heritage, I 
would argue, alongside the play of root concepts that these various 
uses suggest, one arrives at a fuller understanding of the emergent 
notion of the virtual. 
 
 
2 
 
Historically virtue – or in its Roman guise, virtus – invokes the 
concept of man in terms that are physical.  On one hand, virtus has 
been measured as manly strength:  Hercules was its Renaissance 
ideal.1  On the other hand, virtus has been understood in terms not 
of sheer physical power but of mastery over the body, especially 
under conditions of extreme mental stress.  Thus the virtue of a 
soldier – which the Greeks called arête and which the Latin word 
initially translated – lay in his ability to control the body’s impulses 
amid the chaos of the battlefield, to hold his ground when the mind 
screamed, “Flee!” 
 
 
3 
 
As Alasdair MacIntyre has suggested, Plato’s account of the virtues 
in the Republic was “part of his strategy to expel the Homeric 
inheritance from the city-state.”2  This coöpted virtue for the 
scholar and turned the word away from the purview of Homeric 
heroes, who were non-reflective and physical (as opposed to 
metaphysical).  Even here the root connection to marshalling the 
body’s resources is evident:  the virtues were the undisputed 
crystalline centers – of character, of soul – that make the wise man 
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and teacher consistent with himself at all times.  Both the 
Aristotelian understanding of the virtues (as dispositions cultivated 
for acting or feeling in particular ways) and the Kantian view 
(where acting virtuously means acting against personal inclination) 
preserved the term’s bodily core.  The Aristotelian thought more of 
exercising, the Kantian more of exorcising, but both measured 
virtue in relation to the body’s “honesty.”3 
 
4 
 
The virtuous woman, particularly according to eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century moralists, might be said to control her body, 
except that sexual “liberation” took that vocabulary for itself.  The 
heart of the issue here is not physical or even metaphysical but 
political.  In other words, whether or not the virtuous woman had 
control over her body in relation to her mind was secondary.  
When her body was at the disposal of the family, particularly its 
male heads, the woman was represented as maintaining her virtue 
in the face of the world’s multitudinous inconstancies.  When a 
woman became the measure of her own worth and took charge of 
her own decisions about how to live, with whom, and under what 
conditions, virtue was represented as having been “corrupted.”  
When a family lost control over her body, she was said to lose her 
virtue.  All the while, paradoxically in the context of virtue’s 
historical roots, she was gaining greater control over her body. 
 
 
5 
 
The virtuoso is one who masters the difficulties of manipulating 
the body to achieve amazing feats of agility.  Thus in music, a 
virtuoso performer is one who sees an action with the mind’s eye 
and translates it instantly, with no apparent effort, into bodily 
motion and sound.  This sense of virtue as effect, and the virtuoso 
as one whose success is measured by effectiveness in action, is 
familiar to scholars of Machiavelli.  It also provides a possible 
provenance for at least one sense of virtual reality, namely, as that 
which is as effective as reality (see also below).4 
 
 
6 
 
Virtual also could be understood primarily as a kind of corporeal 
honesty, at least until recently.  To call someone a virtual dictator 
has been to assert something that might not be plain from 
appearance.  For the person making this claim, the virtue, or 
capacity, of such a dictator would manifest an underlying state:  
some real or essential being not immediately apparent, a concealed 
corpus.  In a similar manner, to call someone a virtual saint would 
be to ascribe an “undisputed crystalline center” to that person, 
despite its perhaps not being perceived. 
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7 
 
A linkage to land is a prominent constituent of classical republican 
virtue.  Machiavelli wrote that the vigor of an uncorrupt republic, 
like that of an invincible army, proceeds from a society of 
independent freeholders used to hard work and bred to endure 
discomfort.  The natural and virtuous attachment is to land, but 
not in a transcendental sense.  The ground for virtue is not the 
Earth, Gaia, or any such post-Romantic entity; it is property, a 
binding social construction that links a person to others in a 
particular way.  Land as property gives an individual weight and 
value within a group.  It helps provide what Hegel, at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, conceived as the conditions of mutual 
recognition.  Related figures range from “being rooted” to “getting 
around,” and these mutually defining extremes highlight telling 
shifts in the conceptualization of virtue over time.  In maintaining 
a republic, virtue evoked the need for “rooted” citizens.  In 
protecting public morality in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, virtue invoked the need for sexual constancy, especially 
by women, in modern society.  In advancing sexual and political 
liberation in the twentieth century, virtue provoked the need for 
active authenticity by individuals of both sexes.5 
 
 
8 
 
The virtual saint whose saintly corpus is somehow concealed from 
the view of the church hierarchy, and the virtual saint who provides 
confession in an online “virtual confessional” appear separated by 
a conceptual divide.  One is real but unrecognized, the other 
recognized but unreal.  What links them is effect, force, or power; 
and this is the sense of virtue that remains in the English phrase 
“by virtue of.”  The Oxford English Dictionary reports a 
seventeenth-century use of “virtual church” to mean “a council or 
similar body acting in the name of the whole church.”  This is not a 
digital body that recognizes virtual saints who man virtual 
confessionals.  Yet it is “capable of producing a certain effect or 
result.”  In this sense, the virtual is “effective, potent, powerful,” 
and – according to the same source – obsolete.  But is it? 
 
 
9 
 
Beyond popular culture, the question of the reality of virtual reality 
surfaces in a variety of disciplines from artificial intelligence and 
psychology to political theory and law.6  There the issue is precisely 
the effect or power of virtual phenomena.7  The importance of 
these discussions lies less in verbal answers than in the ways the 
conversations alter our orientations to things and people, in how 
we position bodies of various kinds in relation to one another.  To 
the extent that our world is one of “consensual fantasy” as J.G.A. 
Pocock has written or a “symbolic public order” in the terms of 
Slavoj Žižek, virtual phenomena may not pose much of a change.  It 
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has been several centuries, after all, that we have been actively 
cultivating “the exchange of forms of mobile property” and “modes 
of consciousness suited to a world of moving objects” with values 
that rise and fall with the apparent sense and order of rumor.8  
Isn’t the virtual simply part of a long process, every step of which 
we have learned to accept with virtuoso flexibility?  The question is 
not how real – and therefore how liberating or dangerous – are 
virtual phenomena, but how different they are from the already 
“unreal” phenomena that fill our daily lives. 
 
10 
 
Having written these words, I must step back – embodied as I am 
– to acknowledge that the virtual challenge is not some 
simulacrum of a challenge but a real challenge that involves the 
advent of things virtual:  virtual documents, virtual hospitals, 
virtual pornography, even virtual empathy.  These challenge the 
virtues evoked here.  They challenge identity, sexuality, sociality, 
and political health.  And they turn on a pivotal question:  In a 
virtual world, what constitutes authentic control over bodies, 
whether physical, social, or political?  Just about every word in the 
question provokes further issues, and this essay only sketches a 
framework for initiating responses to them.  Rather than digging 
deeper philologically, let me pose the question in another form. 
 
 
11 
 
My nine-month-old son lifts his hand then opens and closes his 
fingers when prompted by the sound “Bye-bye!”  He smiles and 
seems pleased without truly understanding the gesture or the word 
that accompanies it.  If he understood after all, he might be sad, 
not happy, when asked to perform it upon Papa’s departure for 
work.  He looks at his fingers, rising and falling as if they are not 
him or at least not his body, alien entities he is only slowly learning 
to control.  It is not yet a virtuoso performance.  Nevertheless I 
know one day he will make the conceptual connections to enter the 
realm of consensual fantasy, to join us there and dwell among us to 
the end of his days.  I suspect he will linger on its fringes for some 
time, uncertain as to what it means to enter, just as now he is 
uncertain as to what it means to wave to Papa, who is smiling 
stupidly with his own hand flopping in the air beyond the glass of 
the kitchen door.  And I am struck by a possibility:  If one day he 
makes the conceptual connection from virtue to virtual and if, 
being a thoroughly contemporary child, he understands the virtual 
but sees virtue only at the dim periphery of his life’s experience, he 
may very well ask, “Papa, what is virtue?”  What, I wonder, will I 
tell him? 
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 Notes  
 
 
 
1     This was the image reborn, if not created anew, by Renaissance 
writers and artists, who saw Hercules as the vir perfectissimus, a 
symbol of “virtue in all its aspects – physical, moral, spiritual, and 
even intellectual.”  Karl G. Galinsky, The Herakles Theme:  The 
Adaptations of the Hero in Literature from Homer to the 
Twentieth Century, Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1972, p. 
197. 
 
 
 
 
2     Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, Notre Dame, IN, University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1984, p. 131.  
 
 
 
3     Honestas is the other Latin word sometimes used to translate 
the Greek arête.  On the difference between a plural and a singular 
usage – the virtues as opposed to virtue – with particular attention 
to the history of Stoicism, see ibid., pp. 168-70. 
 
 
 
 
4        I am indebted to John Nelson, of the University of Iowa, for 
pointing out the importance of this connection.  
 
 
 
5     For a cogent discussion of the trend towards feminizing virtue 
with the rise of bourgeois culture, see Terry Mulcaire, “Public 
Credit:  Or, the Feminization of Virtue in the Marketplace,” PMLA, 
114, 5, October, 1999, pp. 1029-1042. 
 
 
 
 
6     Noteworthy examples include Sherry Turkle, Life on the 
Screen:  Identity in the Age of the Internet, New York, Simon and 
Schuster, 1997; Cass Sunstein, Republic.com, Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press, 2001. 
 
 
 
 
7     Sunstein goes so far as to make governmental policy 
recommendations that might counteract the socially fragmentary 
effects of the internet.  His is essentially a variation on a very old 
riff: while clearly powerful, consensual fantasy may also “unleash” 
the dark forces that will destroy us.  Turkle’s approach is more 
descriptive and empirical, while her suggestions about the fluidity 
of current identity formation among young people are less easily 
contextualized within the conceptions of virtue noted in this essay. 
 
 
 
 
8     J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment:  Florentine 
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, 
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 464.  Slavoj  
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Žižek’s phrase is from his Sublime Object of Ideology, London, 
Verso, 1989, p. 68. 
                        
 
